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Abstract How can international organizations persuade governments to adopt pol-
icy recommendations that are based on private information when their interests con-
flict? We develop a game-theoretic model of persuasion that applies regardless of
regime type and does not rely on the existence of domestic constituency constraints+
In the model, an international organization ~IO! and a domestic expert have private
information about a crisis, but their preferences diverge from those of the govern-
ment, which must choose whether to delegate decision making to the expert+ Persua-
sion can take place if the international institution is able to send a credible signal+We
find that this can take place only if the preferences of the IO and the domestic expert
diverge and the institution holds the more moderate policy position+ This result con-
trasts with conventional wisdom, which holds that the necessary condition for IOs to
exert influence is support from a domestic constituency with aligned preferences+ Our
model suggests that, far from being an obstacle to international cooperation, polar-
ized domestic politics may be a necessary condition for IOs to exert effective influence+
International organizations ~IOs! have been tasked with providing early warnings
on a wide range of issues, but state leaders and informed publics have become
increasingly skeptical about their policy advice+ There are inherent conflicts of
interest between IOs and their individual member states, and the legitimacy of
important IOs is subject to persistent challenges+ The effectiveness of international
institutions as policy advisors depends on trust+ Under what conditions can an inter-
national institution credibly convey information to a government that does not share
its preferences?
Consider three examples+ In 2007, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change ~IPCC! issued its Fourth Assessment Report, which summarized recent
research indicating that global climate change was progressing more rapidly than
previously believed and called for dramatic reductions in carbon emissions+ It has
no power to enforce these recommendations+ In 2003, the World Health Organiza-
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tion ~WHO! warned that a viral outbreak in southern China posed a global health
risk, coined the term Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome ~SARS!, and called on
the Chinese government to take remedial action+ The WHO has no enforcement
powers+ In the months and years leading up to the currency crises in Brazil in
1999 and Argentina in 2001, the International Monetary Fund ~IMF! sought to
warn the respective governments that their exchange rate policies were unsustain-
able in the absence of painful budget cuts+ During most of this time, the IMF had
no active lending facility with either country, so it had to rely on persuasion+ In
each case, governments were skeptical because IOs do not bear the costs of policy
changes+ Successful warnings are possible only when the IO is credible, and we
argue that this depends on domestic conditions+
We seek to address three limitations in the existing rational-choice literature on
international institutions+ First, the literature has generally neglected the possibil-
ity that IOs might give their members deceptive advice+1 Formal models of IO
influence typically assume that differences arise between the policy preferences of
IOs and national leaders because leaders are biased, and IOs can solve the prob-
lem by speaking directly to voters who share their preferences and are in a posi-
tion to punish the leaders for undesirable policies+2 However, the conflict of interest
between states and IOs may be more fundamental, arising from the fact that IOs
are multilateral bodies with different policy goals than individual governments+
IOs that pursue their own agendas may have incentives to misrepresent their pri-
vate information+ Second, while this literature has identified important domestic
mechanisms of IO influence, the focus on electoral mechanisms has limited its
scope to democracies+ The literature has had little to say, for example, about how
an IO can influence the policies of an authoritarian government+3 Third, the for-
mal literature on communication concludes that agents can only credibly transmit
messages that run counter to their biases+ However, IOs often need to communi-
cate information that appears to corroborate their known biases+ For example, how
can the WHO send a credible warning about a global health crisis if it is perceived
as holding a bias in favor of taking extreme precautions? The literature in econom-
ics and political science on information transmission suggests that it cannot; com-
munication fails when the true state of the world corresponds to claims that the
biased agent has an incentive to make+ A general theory of IO crisis management
1+ There are two related formal literatures on opportunism by IOs, but neither addresses this prob-
lem+ Principal-agent models of delegation consider IO opportunism when given discretion+ Hawkins
et al+ 2006+ Procedural models of legislation in the European Union consider the opportunities for
supranational bodies to exert influence by setting the agenda+ Thomson et al+ 2006+ Neither considers
the possibility that an IO strategically manipulates private information in order to influence the poli-
cies of a member state+ An exception is Johns 2007, which considers the choice of an international
agent by two states that bargain over a policy, and argues that choosing a biased agent may be optimal
for member states+ The problem we analyze here is the reverse: given that an IO has different prefer-
ences than a government, under what conditions can the IO give credible advice?
2+ See Dai 2007; Fang 2008; Milner 1997; and Chapman 2009+
3+ Simmons 2009 is a prominent exception that offers a domestic mechanism of IO influence that
applies to nondemocracies, but focuses on treaties as coordination devices rather than on IOs as sources
of information+
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should address all three of these concerns+ It should provide a causal mechanism
that applies in both democratic and nondemocratic contexts, which sheds light on
how IOs can build trust with governments despite their conflicts of interest, and
which explains how IOs can communicate information effectively even when the
information appears to confirm their known biases+
We develop a game theoretic model of persuasion that applies to all types of gov-
ernments+ In democratic and nondemocratic political systems alike, leaders must
decide how to allocate their attention across a variety of issues, and as a result they
must be rationally ignorant, or at least relatively uninformed, about some public
policy issues+ When an international institution perceives a potential crisis situa-
tion, it can raise the profile of one of these issues by sending a signal that the state
of the world urgently demands policy change+ In response, the government can either
implement a policy directly or delegate the decision to a domestic agent who has
special expertise+ We assume that the leader generally finds it costly to adjust pol-
icy+ The costs could take the form of budgetary expenses, loss of reputation involved
in admitting mistakes, or imposing costs on important constituents; more gener-
ally, they reflect the assumption that prior policies were chosen because they were
politically optimal, so deviating from them is costly+ The IO and domestic experts
do not internalize such costs, so from the government’s point of view, their advice
is unreliable+ When the government delegates, therefore, it allows an agent with
different preferences to influence its policies in ways that it might not choose were
it more fully informed+ However, it may nevertheless prefer to delegate the policy
to domestic experts if policy change is not too costly and domestic experts have
valuable expertise+ Under some circumstances, the IO has an incentive to misrep-
resent its information to induce the government to delegate the decision making to
the expert+ The model thus identifies a conflict of interest between a government
and an IO but finds conditions under which the IO can nevertheless effectively trans-
mit information and influence a government’s policy+
We contrast the results of three versions of the model+ In the baseline model
there are only unbiased experts who share the objectives of the IO and want to
adopt the most appropriate policy given the state of the world+ Extensions of the
model allow for two ways in which the domestic expert may be biased, either
having a preference to take precautions against potential crises even when the objec-
tive situation indicates that they are unwarranted, or to maintain the status quo
policy regardless of the state of the world+
In the baseline model, with unbiased experts, we find that there is no truth-
telling equilibrium in which the IO honestly reports its private information to the
government and the government acts on it+4 When the cost of implementing the pol-
4+ A truth-telling equilibrium requires that it is incentive compatible for the agent to send a truthful
report if the report will be believed and affect the recipient’s strategy+ When such an equilibrium does
not exist, the agent ~in this case, the IO! has an incentive to misrepresent its private information+ In our
model, the IO does not know the true state of the world with certainty, but it may misrepresent its
beliefs+ In particular, when it receives a low signal, the IO may have an incentive to recommend a
policy that the government would prefer to take only if the IO had in fact received a high signal+
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icy is too high or too low, the government’s policy choice will not be affected by
the institution’s signal; when the cost is in the middle range where the institution’s
information matters, however, the institution has an incentive to misrepresent the
signal that it receives to motivate the government to delegate the policy to the expert+
As a result, a truth-telling equilibrium does not exist+ Ironically, however, the exis-
tence of biased experts who always prefer the precautionary policy makes credible
communication possible+ When experts are unbiased, the IO categorically prefers
that the government delegate to the expert, so the IO’s advice is not credible+When
experts are expected to be biased in favor of an extreme policy with a high prob-
ability, however, there exist conditions under which the IO might prefer that the
experts control the policy only if it honestly believes that the state of the world is
favorable for an activist response+ In this case, the IO sends different messages when
it receives different signals, so the government can rationally believe the IO’s rec-
ommendation, and this can lead it to delegate authority to an expert+ Finally, in the
case where the expert is biased with a high probability but in the opposite direc-
tion, in favor of maintaining the status quo, we again obtain the result that there is
no truth-telling equilibrium+
We build on a literature that investigates the mechanisms for IOs to exert influ-
ence over democracies, but identify a common mechanism—empowerment of
domestic experts—that can operate in both democratic and nondemocratic con-
texts+ The IO in our model does not directly recommend policies or suggest per-
sonnel changes to the government, but it exercises influence when it is able to
send a credible signal to the government+ Our model relates to the literature on
principal-agent relationships, which has developed to explain why principals del-
egate and whether, given divergent preferences, truthful information can be trans-
mitted between the agent and the principal+5 We find that the existence of two
agents with divergent interests—the IO and the domestic policy expert—makes
credible information transmission possible in such circumstances+ Our ironic result
is that the necessary condition for trust between the IO and the government is
their shared mistrust of the domestic expert+ This contrasts with the conventional
wisdom, which holds that the domestic conditions that are most favorable for IO
influence arise when domestic constituencies have preferences that are closely
aligned with those of the IO+
Trust and Information Transmission
International institutions influence state policies and promote multilateral cooper-
ation in a number of ways, but most accounts of their influence deemphasize overt
coercion and emphasize instead the role of information+6 Most institutions are inca-
pable of coercing their members and instead foster cooperation by providing infor-
5+ See Crawford and Sobel 1982; Gilligan and Krehbiel 1987; Dessein 2002; and Gailmard 2009+
6+ See Keohane 1984; and Reinhardt 2001+
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mation and expertise, or by authoritatively defining rules and expectations+7 Even
institutions that have some coercive powers on paper generally find them difficult
to deploy, and exercise more influence as referees than as a police force+ Persua-
sion is key to the influence of IOs+
Trust, in turn, is a necessary condition for successful persuasion+ If govern-
ments perceive that international institutions are pursuing policies detrimental to
their interests, they disregard their policy advice+ Cheap talk is cheap; in general,
it is difficult to credibly share information when there is a conflict of interest+8
Recent contributions to international relations have treated trust as a fundamental
factor in international security+ Sartori argues that the reputation for truth-telling
plays an important role in avoiding international conflict, and Kydd explores the
effects of trust and mistrust on conflict and cooperation during the Cold War+9
Trust is similarly important in the relations between states and IOs+ Trust is prob-
lematic because IOs have incentives to misrepresent their private information to
encourage governments to choose policies that they prefer+ Prominent accounts of
the IMF, for example, focus on the tension between national objectives and inter-
national agendas+10 Potential conflict of interest between IOs and national govern-
ments is an essential feature of a model of persuasion, and the question is whether
information can be transmitted credibly in this environment+
While the existing formal literature recognizes that conflicts of interest arise
between governments and IOs, it sidesteps the problem of credible communica-
tion that is our focus+ The standard setup for such models treats IOs as nonstrate-
gic actors that make technocratic recommendations, and focuses on uncertainty
about the type of the national leader, who has incentives to adopt short-term or
self-interested policies+ The incentives and strategies of IOs are unproblematic by
assumption+11 This modeling convention may be appropriate for some purposes;
however, the mistrust that it assumes away is substantively important, and may
play a key role in determining IO effectiveness+ It is likely that preferences diverge
simply because IOs are multilateral bodies; in the best case scenario, the prefer-
ences of international institutions reflect some aggregation of the preferences of
their member states+ In a crisis situation where global public health or financial
stability are in the balance, an international body is unlikely to have the same
perspective as the government that is in charge on the ground or the public in the
affected country+ Local actors do not necessarily internalize the global conse-
quences of the crisis, and local actors, rather than the IO, bear the costs of the
policy responses+ Under these circumstances, the IO may not be able to credibly
convey the private information that it has+ Trust may not be possible+
The economic literature on information transmission between a principal and
an agent finds that the information content of messages declines as interests become
7+ Barnett and Finnemore 2004+
8+ Fearon 1995+
9+ See Sartori 2005; and Kydd 2005+
10+ See Vreeland 2003; Dreher and Vaubel 2004; and Woods 2006+
11+ See Dai 2005; Fang 2008; and Chapman 2009+
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more conflictual+12 A related literature on third-party mediation in political sci-
ence finds that biased mediators are more effective than unbiased ones, because
biased mediators can credibly convey information that is contrary to their own
biases+13 Similarly, a literature in economics explores the conditions under
which governments can credibly convince voters that the state of the world
justifies policy change, and concludes that such arguments are credible only
when they run counter to the government’s known policy preferences+14 All of
this literature suggests that persuasion should be difficult for IOs because
conflicts of interest frequently arise between IOs and the governments that they
attempt to coordinate+ Moreover, the problem may be intractable in crisis situa-
tions because in those cases IOs have to convince skeptical governments to heed
their alarms, in spite of the fact that they have incentives to send warnings even
in good times+ In other words, in order for IOs to be effective information pro-
viders, they need to gain trust even when their information seems to confirm their
biases+ Under what circumstances can persuasion succeed in spite of the fact that
governments know that international institutions have different objectives than
they do?
Combining domestic experts and IOs provides a mechanism to explain the spread
of ideas and change in state behavior+15 IOs influence government policy by engag-
ing in persuasion, which in terms of our model means that rational government
agents choose to respond to the IO’s signals by adjusting their policies+ Persua-
sion is possible only if the government trusts the IO as a source of information,
and in the context of the model, trust is possible only if truth-telling is an optimal
strategy for the IO+ Therefore, we solve for truth-telling equilibria in which the IO
truthfully reveals its signal about the state of the world, and in turn, the govern-
ment believes the message sent by the IO+ We find that domestic experts play a
key role in allowing effective information transmission to take place at the inter-
national level+ The analysis thus identifies conditions under which trust can be
built between an IO and a government, conditions that allow the IO to influence
the government’s policy through its message+Moreover, expert influence is a mech-
anism that applies to autocratic as well as to democratic states, so it offers a gen-
eral explanation for IO influence+
The substantive claim underlying our model is that IOs exercise much of their
influence by empowering local experts+ This may occur at the level of interactions
between national leaders and cabinet ministers, or at lower levels of the bureau-
cracy+ The agents in our model can be interpreted as a head of government who
12+ Crawford and Sobel 1982+
13+ See Calvert 1985; and Kydd 2003+
14+ See Cukierman and Tommasi 1998; and Drazen and Masson 1994+
15+ Domestic experts can be thought of as policy entrepreneurs, which figure prominently in work
in international relations and comparative politics on the influence of ideas+ Goldstein and Keo-
hane 1993+ For example, Checkel 1997 describes the origin of the New Thinking under Soviet leader
Mikhail Gorbachev in terms of policy entrepreneurs+
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appoints a minister, a minister who appoints a deputy, a deputy who appoints a
department head, etc+ At each link in the delegation chain, the ubiquitous conflicts
of interest between IOs and their member states render the policy advice that IOs
provide in times of crises immediately suspect; however, the existence of domes-
tic experts mitigates the problem of mistrust+ This mechanism does not depend on
the local experts being more trustworthy than the international ones—in fact, as
we show, the mechanism breaks down if they are too trustworthy+ Instead, the
mechanism works because the IO is reluctant to empower biased local experts, so
when it does send a crisis message in spite of the fact that local experts may be
biased, the message is credible+ The mechanism of the model does depend on the
assumption that local experts have an information advantage over their govern-
ment superiors and over the IO+ Delegation is generally optimal only if the agent
has an information advantage+ In this case, the information advantage relates to
local conditions+ IOs may have superior scientific expertise, but there is generally
some advantage to local knowledge, so it would be impractical for the IO to devise
an optimal policy independently+
Global climate change provides an example of the operation of this mechanism+
Joseph Fourier discovered the greenhouse effect in 1824, and Svante Arrhenius
linked it to carbon dioxide levels in 1896, but a scientific consensus about anthro-
pogenic climate change emerged only around 1990, with the publication of the
first report of the IPCC+ Substantial uncertainty remains about the likely extent of
global climate change, its local consequences, and the effect of measures to reduce
carbon emissions, and many skeptical governments, particularly in developing coun-
tries, have chosen not to implement costly policy changes+ Several IOs formed
around the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change ~UNFCCC!
in 1992, including a secretariat that has organized a series of annual Conferences
of the Parties ~COP1–COP17!, and these have formed a platform to publicize the
reports of the IPCC+ Developing countries, led by China, refused to adopt quanti-
tative emissions reduction targets in the Kyoto Protocol+ Nevertheless, continuous
international negotiations have elevated the status of environmental experts in
China, and the publication of the Fourth IPCC Assessment Report in 2007 led its
Politburo for the first time to devote one of its study sessions to climate change+16
In April 2007, Wan Gang, the president of Tongji University, was appointed Min-
ister of Science and Technology—the first cabinet minister in three decades who
was not a member of the Communist Party+ Wan had a Ph+D+ in mechanical engi-
neering from Clausthal University of Technology in Germany and had worked for
Audi as an expert in the use of renewable energy in automobiles+ China sub-
sequently announced a series of initiatives to reduce the carbon intensity of its
economy and has been investing heavily in renewable energy technology+ It now
appears that China has gradually been persuaded of the significance of climate
change, and that the mechanism of persuasion includes a change in personnel+
16+ Mary-Anne Toy, “Chinese Prepare to Tackle Warming,” The Age, 6 February 2007, 7+
International Organizations as Policy Advisors 543
Model
There are three actors in our model: an international institution, I, a government,
G, and a domestic expert, E+ The state of the world is u  $0,1% , where 0 repre-
sents no crisis, and 1 represents a crisis situation+ Each state occurs with equal
probability+ The institution receives a private signal about the state of the world, sI
 $0,1% , and then sends a publicly observable message, mI  $0,1% , to the gov-
ernment about the signal+ If the institution is truthful, the message takes the same
value as the signal+ The institution’s signal is correct with probability a given a
state of the world, that is, Pr~sI  0 6u  0!  Pr~sI  16u  1!  a, where a
 ~102,1!+ Note that the institution’s signal is informative so that it improves on
the prior belief of the government, but it is not perfectly correlated with the true
state of the world+
After receiving the institution’s message, the government can implement a pol-
icy x  @0,1# directly or delegate the decision to the domestic expert+ We assume
that the status quo policy is consistent with the belief that the state of the world is
0, and any change of the policy is costly+ The expert receives a private signal, sE
 $0,1% about u+ We assume that given a state of the world, the expert’s signal is
independent of the institution’s, and is of a higher quality, that is, Pr~sE  0 6u
 0!  Pr~sE  16u  1!  b, where b  ~a,1# + The quality of each signal is
common knowledge+
There are two types of experts: unbiased and biased+ The unbiased type shares
the preference of the IO and prefers to implement a policy that corresponds to the
state of the world+ The biased type prefers a particular policy regardless of the
true state of the world+ In the baseline model we assume that the expert is unbi-
ased; we then extend the model to cases in which experts may be biased+
To summarize, the sequence of play is as follows+ Nature chooses the state of
the world, u+ The institution receives a signal, sI , and then sends a publicly observ-
able message, mI , to the government+ After receiving the message, the govern-
ment can either choose a policy, x  @0,1# , and end the game, or delegate the
decision to a domestic expert+ If G delegates the decision to the expert, the expert
chooses a policy to implement based on mI and its own signal sE + ~See Figure 1+!
The actors have utility functions as follows+ The IO wants to adopt a policy that
matches the state of the world+ This preference is captured by the following utility
function:
uI   x if u 0
x1 if u1+
~1!
From the IO’s perspective, when the true state of the world is 0, policies that
deviate from 0 are costly; when the true state of the world is 1, policies that devi-
ate from 1 are costly+ This is consistent with the interpretation that the IO is sen-
sitive to evaluations of its advice that are made after the true state of the world is
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revealed, perhaps because it seeks to maintain a reputation as an honest broker+
The government shares the IO’s preference to take an action that matches the state
of the world; however, it has an additional concern about the cost of changing the
status quo, k  0+ Recall that we assume the status quo policy is consistent with
the belief that the state of the world is 0; thus, when the state of the world is
believed to be 1, a change in policy is desirable+ The government’s utility function
therefore has two components:
uG   x kx if u 0
x1 kx if u1+
~2!
The utility function of an unbiased expert is identical to that of the IO+ Like the
IO, the expert does not internalize the cost of implementing the policy; the expert’s
only concern is to adopt the most appropriate policy given the state of the world+
The cost creates a tension between the government’s policy preference and that of
the IO and the expert+
The model is a game of incomplete information, and is solved for perfect Bayes-
ian equilibria ~PBE! in pure strategies+ We assume that when the government is
indifferent between choosing a policy directly and delegating the decision to the
expert, it chooses a policy directly+17
After analyzing the case where the expert is unbiased with certainty, we extend
the model to cases where the expert is biased with probability p  ~0,1! in favor
17+ This is equivalent to assuming that there is a small cost of delegating the policy to the expert+
FIGURE 1. Time line of the game
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of a particular policy, x  1 or x  0+ If the expert is biased toward x  1, the
expert’s utility function is uE  x 1+ This scenario captures the selection bias in
expert recruitment+ That is, experts may be policy outliers: they think that the
issues related to their expertise are important, and they self-select into their areas
of expertise for that reason+ For instance, environmental scientists tend to favor
environmental causes+ If the expert is biased toward policy x  0, the expert’s
utility function is uE  x+ This agent has a status-quo bias, which represents an
actor who benefits from policy inertia or finds policy change costly+ The Chinese
party functionaries during the SARS outbreak who preferred to hide the severity
of the crisis to minimize social unrest serve as an example+We analyze these three
scenarios in turn in the next section+
Equilibrium Results
The focus of our analysis is whether the IO has an incentive to misrepresent the
signal that it receives+ If the IO would have an incentive to misrepresent its signal
if it were believed, the government must rationally disregard any message the IO
sends+ Therefore, we solve for truth-telling equilibria+ We present three proposi-
tions, corresponding to the scenarios with an unbiased expert, with an expert that
may be biased in favor of policy activism, and with an expert that may be biased
in favor of maintaining the status quo+ We first analyze the baseline case where
the expert is unbiased+
Unbiased Expert
We first characterize a truth-telling equilibrium, if it exists+ Suppose the govern-
ment believes that the IO truthfully reveals its signal, and the government decides
whether to delegate policy to the expert based on the IO’s message+ In this case,
we find that, all else equal, the government becomes more willing to delegate pol-
icy to the expert as the expert’s signal ~b! becomes more accurate, but becomes
less willing to delegate as the institution’s signal ~a! becomes more accurate+ The
more accurate the expert’s signal is, the better the policy choice that the expert
makes, which increases the incentive to delegate+ However, as the IO’s signal
becomes more accurate, the marginal policy improvement from delegating policy
to the expert declines because the government is able to rely on the IO’s message
to implement better policies directly+ Consequently, the government has an incen-
tive to implement policy directly because the expert does not internalize the cost
of policy change as the government does+
The unit cost of implementing a policy, k, plays a critical role in the government’s
decision about whether to delegate+ If the cost is high, the government prefers to
implement a policy directly to prevent the expert from choosing a costly policy+





if mI  0, and k2 
a b1
1 a b 2ab
if mI  1, above
which the government will not delegate the decision making to an expert+
In contrast, the IO always prefers delegation to an unbiased expert, regardless
of the signal it receives+ The expected utility for the IO is always higher when the
expert rather than the government chooses policy, for two reasons+ First, the gov-
ernment has an incentive to choose a lower policy action than is optimal from the
IO’s perspective, because the government bears the cost of implementing the pol-
icy+ Second, the expert’s signal is more accurate than the IO’s, so the expert is
positioned to choose a better policy+
Does this conflict of interest create an incentive for the IO to misrepresent its
private information to the government? Such an incentive exists in some states of
the world if truth-telling would result in the government implementing a policy
directly, while sending a warning message would result in the government delegat-
ing the decision to the expert+ When the cost is no greater than k1, or at least as
high as k2, the institution’s message cannot change the government’s behavior
because the government always delegates when the cost is sufficiently small ~k
 k1!, and always implements a policy directly when the cost is sufficiently high
~k  k2!+ As a result, the institution’s message can be arbitrary for these values of
the cost without changing the government’s behavior, and thus the IO can be truth-
ful in a trivial sense+
If the cost falls between the two thresholds, that is, k1  k  k2, the govern-
ment will not delegate if it believes that the institution received the signal sI  0,
but will delegate if it believes that the institution received sI1+Within this range,
the institution’s signal is sufficiently informative that the expected benefit from
letting the expert choose policy outweighs the expected cost of implementing the
policy when sI  1+ However, if the government believes the institution’s message
and acts accordingly, this scenario provides an incentive for the institution to mis-
lead the government+ Specifically, by reporting that there is evidence of an immi-
nent threat of crisis when its signal indicates otherwise, the institution could prompt
the government to delegate the policy to the expert+ Understanding that the insti-
tution categorically prefers delegation, the government expects the IO to send the
message mI  1 regardless of the signal it receives, and consequently disregards
the institution’s message+ As a result, there is no truth-telling equilibrium when
k1  k  k2+ We summarize these results in the following proposition+
Proposition 1: If the domestic expert is unbiased, then no truth-telling equilibrium
exists in which the government delegates the policymaking decision to the expert
contingent on the institution’s message.
Proposition 1 states that there is no truth-telling equilibrium in which the IO
truthfully reports its signal and the government conditions its decision about whether
to delegate on the IO’s message+ In other words, when domestic experts are known
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to share the preferences of the IO precisely, and these preferences differ from those
of the government, there are no circumstances under which the institution can influ-
ence the government’s decision about whether to delegate+ The government ignores
the institution’s message altogether, regardless of the cost of implementing the
policy and regardless of how well informed the IO may be+
Reform-Biased Expert
We now turn to the possibility that domestic experts may be biased+ Suppose the
expert is biased toward policy x  1 with probability p, and unbiased otherwise+
A biased expert, in this sense, may be thought of as an agent who makes princi-
pled decisions rather than pragmatic decisions that depend on the prevailing cir-
cumstances+ Both types of experts will choose according to their true preferences
if the decision is delegated to them+ This means that the biased expert will choose
xE  1, while the unbiased type will choose a policy that is consistent with the
expert’s updated belief about the state of the world+
Interesting new findings emerge in this scenario+ First, the IO no longer cat-
egorically prefers policy delegation: if p is sufficiently large, that is, the proba-
bility is high that the domestic expert is biased, the IO may prefer that the
government choose its own policy rather than delegating+ Second, the expected
utility for the government from delegation decreases in p, so the government is
more reluctant to delegate+ The cost threshold below which the government will
always delegate regardless of the IO’s message, k1' , and the cost threshold above
which it will never delegate, k2' , are smaller than k1 and k2 in the baseline case,
respectively, that is, k1'  k1 and k2'  k2+
As in the baseline case, we have three cases to consider to determine whether
the IO has an incentive to reveal its information to the government truthfully+ The
IO’s message cannot change the government’s behavior when k  k1' or k  k2' ,
because the government either always delegates or never delegates for these val-
ues of k+ If the cost falls between the two thresholds, that is, k1'  k  k2' , and the
institution sends a truthful signal, the government will not delegate if the institu-
tion reports mI  0, but will delegate if the institution reports mI  1, because the
expected benefit from letting the expert choose the policy outweighs the expected
cost of implementing the policy when sI  1+ As in the baseline, this scenario
makes it possible for the institution to manipulate its message, so we turn next to
whether the institution has an incentive to do so in this case+
Indeed, we find that if p is sufficiently small, that is, the domestic expert is
unlikely to be biased, a truth-telling equilibrium does not exist for k1'  k  k2' , as
in the baseline model+ However, if p is sufficiently large, that is, the probability
of encountering a biased domestic expert is high, then it is not in the IO’s interest
to prompt the government to delegate if it believes that the state of the world is
not a crisis+ Delegating to a reform-biased expert is costly when the IO has observed
sI0, because a biased expert will choose a policy x1 regardless of the state of
the world+ Consequently, the international institution truthfully reports that it has
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observed sI  0 when this is the case+ As a result, the message mI  1 is informa-
tive when it is sent, because the IO sends this message only when it observes sI
1+ This makes it possible for the government to utilize the IO’s message to decide
whether or not to delegate+ Ironically, the possibility that domestic experts are
biased is a necessary condition for an international institution to exert influence+
Governments and international institutions make common cause when neither fully
trusts the domestic experts+ We therefore have the following result+
Proposition 2: If with a high probability the domestic expert is reform-biased, then
for some parameter range there exists a unique truth-telling equilibrium in which
the government delegates the policymaking decision to the expert contingent on
the institution’s message.
These two propositions combine to produce a counterintuitive result: it is more
difficult for international institutions to persuade governments to consult domestic
experts that are known to be unbiased than to delegate policy to suspected extrem-
ists+ The logic behind this finding is that the possibility that the expert is biased
disciplines the IO+ If domestic experts are known to be pure technocrats who fully
share the institution’s preferences and prescribe policies strictly based on their exper-
tise, the international institution has an incentive to misrepresent its private infor-
mation when it observes that the state of the world is not likely to be a crisis+ As a
result, the institution cannot credibly send a message that would persuade the gov-
ernment to delegate policy when it observes the opposite+ On the other hand, the
possibility that the expert is an activist who would prescribe extreme policies deters
the institution from manipulating its message, making the institution a credible
source of information for the government+
Status-Quo Biased Expert
A natural question is whether the result from proposition 2 holds for the other
variant of the model, where the domestic expert may be biased toward the status
quo, x  0+18 In this case, we find that the result does not hold for any p+ When
the expert is biased toward policy 0, the international institution again has an incen-
tive to misrepresent its information for k1'  k  k2' ; consequently, there is no
truth-telling equilibrium+ The intuition is as follows: when the international insti-
tution receives signal 0, it recognizes that truth-telling will lead the government to
do nothing ~choosing policy 0!+ On the other hand, if the institution misrepresents
its signal and the government delegates, there is some chance that an unbiased
expert will be drawn+ There is no downside to delegation from the IO’s point of
view: the biased expert chooses the same policy as the government ~x 0!, while
18+ As discussed earlier, a more appropriate interpretation of the “expert” in this case is a bureau-
crat who has a status quo bias+
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the unbiased expert chooses x  1 only if the expert’s signal indicates that this is
optimal+ Since the expert’s signal is more accurate than the institution’s signal,
this is optimal regardless of the signal the institution receives+ As a result, the
institution always has an incentive to manipulate its message so that the govern-
ment will delegate+ The following proposition summarizes the result+
Proposition 3: If with some probability the domestic expert is status-quo biased,
then no truth-telling equilibrium exists in which the government delegates the policy-
making decision to the expert contingent on the institution’s message+
The implication of the result is identical to that of proposition 1; that is, if the
domestic expert has a status quo bias, there is no truth-telling equilibrium in which
the IO truthfully reports its signal and the government conditions its decision about
whether to delegate on the IO’s message+
To summarize our results: first, when the cost of implementing a policy change
is small, the government always delegates decision making to the expert+ Second,
if the cost of policy change is excessive, the government categorically refuses to
delegate+ So in both cases, the IO’s information does not influence the government’s
policy+ Finally, when the cost is in the intermediate range, the government has an
incentive to delegate if it believes that a crisis is imminent when the IO says so;
however, it does not trust the IO’s message unconditionally+ We show that the IO
is able to credibly convey information and empower domestic experts only when
those experts are believed to be biased in favor of reform with a high probability+
Discussion
The fundamental result of our analysis is that IOs can influence government poli-
cies and promote delegation to policy experts whose preferences diverge from the
government’s, but only when there is a sufficiently high probability that the policy
experts in question are biased in favor of policy innovation+ Bias, in this sense,
means that the policy experts categorically prefer policy innovation irrespective
of the state of the world, which is what justifies policy change from the points of
view of the government and the IO+ Health professionals prefer to take precau-
tions to contain potential epidemics, even if it is possible that the public health
benefits may be meager; while Chinese officials in the SARS case were prepared
to accept the necessity of publicizing the crisis only if the outbreak proved to be
severe+ Neoliberal economists prefer market-oriented reform irrespective of the
business cycle, but governments might feel that such reforms are justified only to
fend off an impending financial crisis+ Environmental scientists prefer to reduce
the degree of global climate change regardless of whether new data indicate that
projected global temperatures will be higher or lower than previously believed,
but these projections may be critical to the cost-benefit calculations of politicians+
The IO and the domestic expert share a bias in the sense that neither pays the
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costs of the new policy, so both are suspect from the government’s point of view+
However, the IO shares the government’s interest in matching the policy to the
state of the world; the domestic agent does not if the expert is reform-biased, and
instead categorically prefers policy change+
When domestic experts are known to share the IO’s preferences precisely, its
message is uninformative because the institution has an incentive in every state of
the world to send a message that will lead the government to delegate+ Conse-
quently, the government cannot learn anything from the IO that would allow it to
update its beliefs, so the IO’s message is disregarded+ The same is true when domes-
tic experts may be biased in favor of the status quo: again, the IO categorically
prefers delegation, so its message is uninformative+ ~In this case, the biased type
of domestic expert chooses the same policy as the government, so delegation costs
the IO nothing, while the unbiased type of the domestic agent chooses policy inno-
vation only when its superior information about the state of the world indicates
that it is justified+! Ironically, in the cases of unbiased or status-quo-biased experts,
where the government would be more willing to delegate ex ante, the IO cannot
provide credible information, so domestic experts are ignored+
When domestic experts may be biased policy activists, on the other hand, gov-
ernments are able to trust IOs because neither fully trusts the domestic experts+
The possibility that domestic experts may be more radical than the IO disciplines
the IO, deterring it from announcing that the state of the world favors radical reform
unless it truly believes that this is the case+ Intuitively, our results suggest that IOs
are most credible when they are moderate, relative to the policy alternatives rep-
resented in domestic politics+
Readers may object to the model we analyze on the grounds that it is unreal-
istic to expect a government—particularly an authoritarian government—to del-
egate policymaking to a domestic expert+ Consequently, we have analyzed a
consultation variant of the game in which the expert’s decision is treated as a
recommendation to the government, and the government retains the choice of the
final policy to implement+ We find that in the context of our model, whenever a
government would consult an expert, it would subsequently prefer to follow the
expert’s advice; consequently, all of our main results from the delegation game
hold in the extended game+ Our results are robust in this sense to a change in the
extensive form of the game+ Delegation and consultation are not equivalent gen-
erally, so we have further investigated the robustness of these findings to changes
in the form of the government’s utility function+ We find that the equivalence
result holds whenever the unit cost of implementing the policy, k, is small enough,
even if the government’s utility function is nonlinear+ We retain the delegation
framework because we believe that when consultation and delegation are dis-
tinct, delegation is substantively more significant+ For example, policymaking in
some contexts requires delegation as a practical matter, as is illustrated by the
examples that we discuss in the following sections+ Furthermore, a substantial
theoretical literature argues that effective consultation generally requires delega-
tion+ Without delegation, experts may not have an incentive to collect informa-
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tion or specialize+19 Moreover, Dessein finds that when the preference difference
between the principal and the agent is large, the agent has an incentive not to
fully reveal private information as analyzed by Crawford and Sobel, and delega-
tion, which grants authority over the use of critical resources, is preferable to
communication+20 Finally, Gailmard shows that without credible commitment any
mechanism that elicits private information reduces to cheap talk, and delegation
is preferable to such mechanisms+21
An Illustration: The SARS Outbreak in China
The outbreak of SARS in China serves as an illustration of the mechanism of our
model+ The new administration of President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao
came into office in March 2003 in the midst of a rapidly spreading epidemic, and
initially the central government was deeply uncertain about the severity of the
crisis+ Lower-level officials had much better information than the central govern-
ment, because censorship, hierarchical reporting structures, and career incentives
filtered out bad news before it could reach the top+ There was a conflict of interest
between policy experts and government officials: health experts favored publicity,
while party functionaries insisted on downplaying the severity of the crisis to con-
tain social unrest+ Indeed, provincial officials in Guangdong sought to hide the
outbreak in January and forbade newspaper reports in February, and, as late as
March, the Ministry of Health prohibited Beijing hospitals from disclosing infec-
tions+ The WHO played a pivotal role by drawing international attention to the
epidemic on 15 March, which convinced the leaders of the central government to
intervene+ The new leaders carried out a purge of top officials, including the min-
ister of health and the mayor of Beijing, and the new leadership publicized the
outbreak and took strong steps to contain its spread+22
From the point of view of our model, the key features of the SARS incident are
that the top Chinese leaders were uninformed about the severity of the crisis; an
international organization, the WHO, was better informed and sounded the alarm;
local experts had the highest-quality information; the Chinese leadership was ini-
tially skeptical about the WHO’s motives; and the WHO’s signals led to personnel
changes that spelled a lasting shift in policy+ The incident highlighted the positions
of both types of biased agents in our model: government officials displayed a sta-
tus quo bias, and health experts who advocated reform were suspected of disloyalty+
The initial response to the SARS outbreak was secrecy and inaction+ SARS
emerged in Guangdong Province in southern China in November 2002 and was
19+ See Gilligan and Krehbiel 1987; and Aghion and Tirole 1997+
20+ See Dessein 2002; and Crawford and Sobel 1982+
21+ Gailmard 2009+
22+ “Outbreak Gave China’s Hu an Opening; President Responded to Pressure Inside and Outside
Country on SARS,” Washington Post, 13 May 2003, A1+
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known to provincial officials no later than 1 January 2003, when an investigative
team was dispatched to Heyuan+ Officials hid the evidence, however, and waited
at least a month before notifying local hospitals+ The outbreak was reported to the
Ministry of Health on 7 February, and it dispatched its own fact-finding team two
days later+ By this time, 900 people had been infected in Guangzhou, almost half
of whom were health professionals+ The next day, a swarm of cellular phone text
messages spread the news of the outbreak throughout China+ Nevertheless, the
provincial party secretary, Zhang Dejiang, continued to forbid newspapers to report
on the epidemic+ A struggle ensued between Zhang ~no relation of the minister of
health of the same last name! and the provincial governor, Huang Huahua, who
authorized an article on the outbreak in Guangzhou Daily+ The president-designate
Hu intervened and declared freedom of the press to report on the epidemic, and
for one week there was a flood of information in local papers+ Zhang reimposed
censorship on 23 February, citing risks to political stability+ Ministry of Health
officials continued to prohibit Beijing hospitals from disclosing SARS cases to
the media in March+ Reasons subsequently cited for secrecy included fears of dam-
aging consumer confidence, deterring foreign investment, and undermining polit-
ical stability+
In terms of our model, this first stage of the SARS crisis was one in which the
status-quo-biased domestic bureaucratic apparatus was in charge on the ground+
As our model predicts, the WHO found it challenging to convince the Chinese
government of the existence and severity of the crisis+ Indeed, the top leaders were
largely invisible at this stage, leaving the WHO officials to struggle with the resis-
tance put up by the Ministry of Health+ The WHO received early signals about the
SARS outbreak through its Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network, and
made its first request for information from the Chinese Ministry of Health on 10
February+ The ministry responded on 11 February that there had been 300 cases of
“atypical influenza” in Guangdong Province, including five fatalities, but the sit-
uation was under control+23 The Ministry of Health blocked two WHO teams sent
to investigate the outbreak from leaving Beijing+ On 12 March, the WHO inter-
vened by issuing its first global health alerts about the virus, which it labeled a
“worldwide health threat,” and on 15 March it labeled the condition produced by
the unknown pathogen “SARS+” This publicity caused a sharp drop in tourism
and business travel to China, and led Morgan Stanley to lower its estimate of eco-
nomic growth in Asia, aside from Japan, from 5+1 percent to 4+5 percent+24 Finally,
China allowed a group of WHO experts to travel to Guangdong Province to assess
the situation on 23 March+ The Chinese government admitted that SARS had spread
beyond Guangdong Province but claimed there were only a few cases+ The WHO
recommended additional measures to control the spread of the disease on 27 March,
23+ Fidler 2004, 74+
24+ “SARS: From China’s Secret to a Worldwide Alarm,” International Herald Tribune, 7 April
2003+
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however, and on 2 April it issued its first-ever travel advisory, warning that Guang-
dong Province and Hong Kong were unsafe because of the SARS epidemic+ The
minister of health denied the scale of the outbreak the following day, but a Chi-
nese doctor sent an open letter to the Western press—at great personal risk—that
challenged the official data about the number of infections+25 Moving beyond the
careful neutrality they had cultivated up to this point, WHO officials seized upon
the evidence produced by medical professionals to contradict Minister Zhang’s
figures and criticize their lack of candor+ This ushered in the second stage of the
SARS crisis+
The dilemma for the Chinese government was whether trust or mistrust was
riskier+ Trusting the WHO analysis of the gravity of the SARS threat implied
acknowledging an embarrassing error, opening up a national discussion of the out-
break, accepting negative publicity, and courting political unrest+A similar discus-
sion in the wake of the Chernobyl disaster in 1986 was widely credited with
hastening the political transformation that ultimately led to the collapse of the Soviet
Union+ The Chinese leadership was determined to avoid Mikhail Gorbachev’s error
and the uncertain circumstances of a leadership transition made them more cau-
tious, rather than less so+ The WHO did not internalize any of these risks+ On the
other hand, the WHO had incentives to avoid crying “wolf” in a situation that
would be embarrassing to the Chinese government+ The WHO’s effectiveness
depends on its reputation as an honest, nonpartisan advisor on public health mat-
ters, and it would be costly to that reputation to make destabilizing claims that
turned out to be false+ If it could rely on the discretion of a disinterested domestic
expert, this might not be overly risky; but Chinese experts appeared likely to push
for a response that the regime considered radical and destabilizing+ Consequently,
the WHO was unlikely to send a warning unless it had reason to believe that SARS
was a grave threat+ In terms of our model, the WHO warning was credible because
responding to it would empower domestic health professionals who appeared likely
to support radical reforms+ This would be costly to the WHO’s standing in China,
should it subsequently be determined that SARS had not posed a grave threat, so
the existence of the radicals lent the WHO credibility as a moderate voice+
The Chinese government abruptly changed course on 17 April+ Rather than
rejecting the WHO’s assertions, the Chinese government moved to replace its top
health officials and begin to cooperate with the WHO+ President Hu told the
Politburo that the government had hidden the extent of SARS infection and
launched an all-out effort to contain the disease+ Within days, a number of high
officials had been replaced, including the obstructionist health minister, Zhang
Wenkang, and Beijing’s mayor, Meng Xuenong+ Their replacements quickly
announced the government’s intentions to increase transparency and, in particu-
lar, to work closely with the WHO+ The position of health minister was filled by
Vice Premier Wu Yi, who had played a key role in negotiating China’s accession
25+ Susan Jakes, “Beijing’s SARS Attack,” Time, 8 April 2003+
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to the WTO+ Liu Qi, a Politburo member with responsibility for the capital, empha-
sized the need to “strengthen international cooperation, especially with the WHO,”
and invited the WHO to nominate experts to serve on Beijing’s SARS control
working group+ Wang Qishan, the acting major of Beijing, emphasized the need
for “transparency+”26 Executive Vice-Minister of Health Gao Qiang announced
revised figures of the number of people infected by SARS, new measures to com-
bat its spread, and subsidies for affected individuals and for hospitals providing
treatment+27
The Chinese government eventually mobilized substantial resources to contain
the spread of SARS, and shortened the week-long May Day vacation to one day
to prevent holiday travel from spreading the disease+ WHO officials emphasized
that publicity was an essential element of their strategy to control the spread of
infection+28 These efforts were successful by June, when the number of new SARS
cases slowed to a trickle+ A sweeping set of policy reforms was introduced by the
new minister of health, including increasing investment in health care and sanita-
tion, particularly in rural areas, and creating a national disease control network+29
Military hospitals, which had refused to report SARS cases outside of the military
chain of command, were for the first time subordinated to the Ministry of Health+
Chinese authorities moved to expand cooperation with the WHO broadly in the
field of public health, and official reports took pains to emphasize the degree of
cooperation taking place at local and national levels+30
Additional Implications: The Limits of IO Influence
Our analysis has observable implications for the way in which IOs exert influ-
ence, for the conditions under which they can be trusted, and for the types of
policies that they can fruitfully promote+ The first implication is that IOs exert
influence by activating the latent influence of reform-minded policy communities
within the countries they are attempting to sway+ This result resonates with recent
empirical work, but the causal mechanism we identify stands in stark contrast to
the conventional wisdom in the literature+ The literature on policy diffusion sug-
gests that IOs play a catalytic role in spreading policy ideas, but that these ideas
26+ “Chinese Official Meets WHO Representative, Beijing to Give Full Cooperation,” Xinhua News
Agency ~via BBC Monitoring!, 27 April 2003+
27+ “SARS Cases Up in Beijing,” China Daily, 21 April 2003+
28+ For example, one of the most effective changes in procedure introduced in Guangdong was to
train medical receptionists to segregate patients with coughs and fevers from other patients until they
could be diagnosed+ “WHO Team Praises Guangdong,” The Straits Times, 10 April 2003+
29+ “WHO Official in China Praises Authorities For ‘Excellent’ Anti-SARS Work,” Xinhua News
Agency ~via BBC Monitoring!, 11 June 2003+
30+ Qian Tong and Cheng Ying, “Being Close To and Responsible For the People: New Chinese
Government’s Efforts To Combat ‘Atypical Pneumonia’ Are Fully Affirmed,” Xinhua News Agency
~via BBC Monitoring!, 29 April 2003+
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take root when conditions are ripe within domestic politics+ Recent research on
the IMF has emphasized the importance of domestic policymaking elites who form
transnational alliances with international bureaucrats and share similar training+
For example, Chwieroth argues that the presence of “sympathetic interlocutors,”
or officials in developing countries who share similar perspectives with IMF offi-
cials because they share a common educational background, is associated with
IMF lending and with liberalization of the capital account+31 Our model proposes
a very different interpretation of these findings+ The IMF is influential not when
local elites exactly share its objectives, but when local elites are likely to favor
more radical reforms, so that the IMF is able to pose as a moderate advisor+
IOs promote policy change by empowering local experts+ Policy experts play a
crucial role because national governments are suspicious of the advice of inter-
national agencies, because they know that their preferences diverge+ Domestic
experts are not held in less suspicion—if they were, the mechanism would break
down—but precisely because they are independent agents who might run out of
control, it is possible for an IO to send a credible signal when a crisis is severe
enough to justify the risk+ Interactions with the IMF tend to raise the profile of the
finance ministry and the central bank within a country’s policymaking process,
and often promote unknown, technocratic economists into positions of political
prominence+ An example is Leszek Balcerowicz who was a virtually anonymous
young economist in 1989, but took the central role in developing Poland’s strat-
egy of economic transition after Tadeusz Mazowiecki tapped him to negotiate with
the IMF, and later in the decade emerged as the leader of a center-right party in
his own right+ Balcerowicz turned out to be a committed reformer who would
have favored rapid privatization and a drastic break with the past regardless of the
economic circumstances, and he staked out a strategy for shock therapy that went
far beyond the IMF’s proposals+32
A second implication of our analysis is that the influence of IOs should decline
as domestic policy experts moderate their positions+ The surprising implication of
the model is that IOs are most influential when domestic policy experts are not
trusted; when the experts become credible and move into the mainstream, in con-
trast, the scope for IOs to influence policy is curtailed+ Continuing to use the exam-
ple of the IMF, our model suggests that neoliberal policymakers are able to play a
critical role in IMF influence only because they represent policy extremists, whose
far-right positions allow the IMF to signal credibly the urgency of policy reform+
The IMF attempts to moderate inflation and increase macroeconomic stability, but
it does not categorically prefer strategies of voucher privatization, fixed exchange
rates, or shock therapy+When it signals that the economic situation is critical, how-
ever, this tips domestic politics in favor of the experts, who may turn out to be
radical reformers+ This, in fact, is what makes the IMF’s signals credible, because
31+ See Chwieroth 2007 and 2013+
32+ See Balcerowicz 1992; and Stone 2002+
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it would not prefer extreme economic policies if the economic situation were less
critical+
The IMF enjoyed remarkable influence in the early 1990s in Argentina and Bra-
zil, both countries that had experimented with populist governments and hyper-
inflation after their transitions to democracy+ In both cases, the IMF succeeded in
impressing upon new governments that overcoming hyperinflation required dras-
tic macroeconomic policy corrections, and both countries turned to technocrats to
head their economic policy teams+ After Argentina suffered successive waves of
hyperinflation, the Peronist President Carlos Menem reluctantly turned the econ-
omy portfolio over to Domingo Cavallo, a former central banker, whom he knew
to hold considerably more orthodox economic views than his own+ In Brazil, the
social democratic Minister of Finance ~and later President! Fernando Cardoso turned
to a group of young, American-educated economists to devise a radical plan to
contain inflation+ Both countries opted for rather extreme forms of exchange-rate-
based stabilization: Brazil adopted the Real Plan, which pegged its new currency
to the dollar, and Argentina adopted its Convertibility Law, which established a
currency board regime and fixed the peso at parity with the dollar+ The IMF was
initially skeptical of both proposals+Although the IMF subsequently became deeply
involved in supporting fixed exchange rate regimes, its view at this time was that
a fixed exchange rate can be a useful nominal anchor to slow inflation during a
transition, but is not a sustainable policy and requires an explicit exit strategy+
Again, in terms of our model, the radical proposals of domestic experts rendered
the IMF a moderate voice+ However, the IMF’s insistence on the severity of the
crisis and the need for radical policy change lent crucial credibility to the domes-
tic policy teams’ calls for economic austerity+
By the late 1990s and the first years of the next decade, however, the IMF’s
leverage had deteriorated markedly in Brazil and Argentina as domestic experts
moved into the political mainstream+ This is surprising, because Brazil and Argen-
tina had both embraced the Washington consensus; each had expanded its ana-
lytical capacity, and each had heavily recruited American-trained economists to
staff its ministries+ The IMF no longer had to search high and low to find interloc-
utors who spoke its language+ Indeed, Brazil and Argentina had become exporters
of economic expertise, and officials from those countries had come to exercise
important responsibilities in the IMF+ Ironically, however, the IMF staff found it
harder to convince the ministries to change their views now that the economists
were on the inside+33 This is all the more surprising because the policy of follow-
ing IMF advice seemed to have worked, and no longer seemed extreme+ Circum-
stances had shifted, however, so that the policy to which local experts were
committed—exchange-rate-based stabilization—was no longer a radical reform pro-
posal+ Fixed exchange rates had become the status quo, and their proponents had
become conventional politicians+ Elections had been waged and won on the basis
33+ See Independent Evaluation Office 2003 and 2004+
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of the fixed exchange rate, and opposition parties had come into office pledging to
defend the peso and the real+
The macroeconomic framework based on a fixed parity became unsustainable,
however, as chronic budget deficits fueled inflation and international competitive-
ness deteriorated+ IMF officials repeatedly called on the governments of Brazil
and Argentina to reduce their budget deficits and their rapidly accumulating for-
eign debts, as mounting budget deficits threatened to unleash a spiral of exploding
debt dynamics and pose the specter of default+34 IMF officials attempted to con-
vince the Brazilian government to devalue its currency in 1998 to avoid a crisis,
but Gustavo Franco, the chairman of the central bank, was a Harvard-trained econ-
omist who insisted that the announced crawling peg be defended+ Brazil suffered
a sharp currency crisis in 1999+When Argentina entered a protracted crisis in 2001,
President Fernando de la Rua refused to take decisive action because his finance
minister, Domingo Cavallo, the architect of the Convertibility Law, was confident
that he could avoid default without devaluing the peso+ A crucial year was lost,
and when the currency crisis struck, it led to bank runs, default on the national
debt, and economic collapse; the president resigned and fled the capital in a heli-
copter+ In Argentina and Brazil, the IMF could persuade governments to take rad-
ical medicine when it could pose as a moderate advisor, but it lost its credibility
when it was more alarmist than the domestic advisors+
A third and broader implication of the model is that IOs maximize their influ-
ence if they produce relatively moderate proposals compared with domestic groups
that vie for influence+Again, the IMF provides a good illustration because its influ-
ence has been at its height when it has taken relatively moderate policy stances+
For most of its history, the IMF has lagged behind rather than led the call for
market liberalization+ The IMF was originally intended to safeguard the system of
fixed exchange rates foreseen at Bretton Woods, and this mandate was assumed to
require the maintenance of capital controls+35 This stance shifted only gradually,
and it was not until abolishing capital controls had become the agenda of the Euro-
pean Union and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
~OECD! that IMF Managing Director Michel Camdessus sought to make it a part
of the IMF’s official mandate+36 This initiative was largely discredited by the Asian
financial crisis of 1997, and the effort to change the formal rules was abandoned
in the following year, although pushing for capital liberalization became the unof-
ficial policy of the IMF in the 1990s+
Meanwhile, the IMF carried out a “silent revolution” that dramatically increased
the comprehensiveness and intrusiveness of the conditionality attached to its loans+37
A minority of IMF loans was covered by binding policy conditionality in the 1970s,
34+ See Mussa 2002; and Stone 2011+
35+ See Helleiner 1994; and Pauly 1997+
36+ Abdelal 2007+
37+ See Boughton 2001; Gould 2006; Dreher and Jensen 2007; and Dreher and Vaubel 2004+
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but conditionality became the norm in the 1980s and universal in the 1990s+ The
scope of policy reforms required under IMF programs expanded rapidly, from an
initial concentration on core macroeconomic policy indicators to a widening cir-
cle of economic policies+ The striking influence of the IMF in the early 1990s
coincided with revolutionary developments in Eastern Europe that discredited state
management of the economy and created political space for experimentation with
market-oriented reforms+ In the process, the IMF moved beyond its traditional com-
petency in macroeconomic policy and began to grapple with the structural fea-
tures of national economies presumed to retard growth+ In the wake of the Asian
crisis, the IMF initially stepped up its conditionality and pioneered a new round of
conditions targeted at the financial sector+
The combination of capital liberalization and expanded conditionality led to a
profound crisis of legitimacy for the IMF+ The IMF was widely blamed for pursu-
ing an excessively severe economic contraction in Korea and excessively ambi-
tious microeconomic reforms in Indonesia, and unsuccessful experiments with IMF
programs polarized politics in many post-Communist and Latin American coun-
tries+ Even IMF insiders and sympathetic outsiders began to speak of a problem
with legitimacy, and this was generally linked to calls to “streamline” condition-
ality and increase the degree of “ownership” of programs by member govern-
ments+38 The most visible symptom of the crisis was that by early 2008 the IMF
was left virtually without borrowers, and because the IMF’s income comes from
the interest on its loans, it was forced to announce a 10 percent staff reduction+
Those constraints were relaxed by the advent of the global financial crisis in fall
2008, which brought the IMF many new customers, but the calls for reforming the
IMF and increasing the share of votes on its executive board held by developing
countries have grown+ In an effort to address the crisis, quota and vote shares in
the IMF were revised in 2008, and new revisions were announced in 2010 that
shifted approximately 6 percent of voting power from the governments of advanced
economies to emerging market countries+ The implication of our model is that
IMF influence was maximized in the early 1990s, when it was relatively moderate
compared to the radical reformers taking office in Eastern Europe and Latin Amer-
ica+ Its subsequent decline in influence coincided with its own drift to the right,
which made governments skeptical when the IMF tried to pose as an honest broker
between themselves and their own domestic experts+
Conclusion
Is it possible for IOs to persuade governments to delegate policymaking authority
to experts? If so, this provides a mechanism by which IOs can exert a socializing
38+ See Hills, Peterson, and Goldstein 1999; Khan and Sharma 2001; Drazen 2002; and IMF 2005+
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influence: experts will gradually change government policies to bring them into
line with international norms+ Policy change imposes costs on government elites,
however, so the question is why a government would allow itself to be convinced
to devolve power to experts+ This behavior becomes particularly puzzling when
the interests of government elites diverge from the interests of IOs, so that the
arguments that IOs use are immediately suspect+ We analyze the possibility that
an IO and a government cooperate in this situation while allowing the strategic
incentives to be fully played out+
Our model is a game of incomplete information in which an international insti-
tution and a domestic policy expert receive private signals about the state of the
world, the institution sends a public signal, and a government must decide whether
to implement a policy reform or delegate policy to an expert who has superior
information but may not share its preferences+We conclude that persuasion is pos-
sible, but only when there is an expected preference difference between the IO
and domestic experts, and only when the international institution holds the more
moderate policy position+ In such cases, the IO can send a credible signal that
directs the government’s attention to domestic experts and makes their expertise
policy relevant+ The intuition for our results is straightforward: if the policy the
expert chooses is exactly what the IO would like it to choose, the IO has an incen-
tive to misrepresent its private information in order to convince the government to
delegate authority+ The IO can credibly communicate its private information only
if it shares the government’s concern that the domestic experts may be biased+
This stands in contrast to the conventional wisdom, which holds that IOs are most
influential when some domestic constituencies share their preferences+
In our model, it is possible for IOs to be more moderate than domestic experts
because IOs seek to match policy to the objective state of the world, while some
types of experts have ideological preferences that do not depend on the state of the
world+ For example, Chinese medical professionals may categorically prefer open-
ness about the public health challenges facing the country regardless of the viru-
lence of a particular virus, and reformist economists may categorically prefer
privatization and reduced public spending, regardless of the probability of a finan-
cial crisis+ The WHO might also categorically prefer openness on the part of the
Chinese government, and the IMF might also prefer to see countries categorically
implement market-oriented reforms, but IOs also have disincentives to mislead the
governments that they seek to influence+ The true state of the world will be revealed
at some point, and the IO’s reputation as an honest advisor would suffer if it had
warned about an impending crisis that never materialized, particularly if its warn-
ing had impelled a skeptical government to undertake costly policy corrections+ IOs
may nevertheless have compelling incentives to stretch the truth when there is uncer-
tainty regarding the true state of the world, but the possibility that the domestic
experts are ideologically motivated types that will implement unnecessary policy
changes can deter them from issuing warnings that are not supported by evidence+
Our analysis has implications for the mechanism by which IOs exert influence,
for the domestic conditions that limit that influence, and for the types of influence
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that can be exerted effectively+When IOs influence domestic politics in our model,
they do so by promoting the careers of elite experts, possibly with activist agen-
das+ Such an effect need not come about because IOs intentionally promote the
careers of reform-biased experts, and this is not what happens in our model; rather,
IOs take calculated risks when they observe crisis signals that have the potential
to involve biased experts in policymaking+ Consequently, environmental IOs can
promote the careers of environmental scientists who prefer activist policies to
reverse pollution and retard global climate change, and economic IOs can pro-
mote the careers of economists who prefer reformist policies+ Such a phenomenon
may shift policy baselines and bring about convergence in government policies
over time+
This mechanism imposes domestic scope conditions on IO influence+ The role
of biased experts in facilitating communication has a surprising implication: far
from being an obstacle to international cooperation, polarized domestic politics
may be a necessary condition for IOs to exert effective influence+ Some of the
most striking cases of IO influence that we have identified occurred when expert
opinion was sharply divided, allowing IOs to send credible signals because there
was a real possibility of delegation to an ideologically motivated type+ On the
other hand, when domestic experts move into the political mainstream, IOs may
no longer be able to credibly signal the need for reform+
Finally, the results have implications for the content of policy advice that can
be credibly communicated+ IOs facilitate cooperation by persuading member gov-
ernments to take actions that are in their own interests, and this is only possible if
IOs can establish trust+ Trust is inherently problematic, however, because IOs aggre-
gate their members’ interests, which are unlikely to be aligned with those of a
particular member during a crisis+ Our results indicate that persuasion and trust
are possible only when the IO takes a position that is moderate with respect to the
policy alternatives provided by domestic politics+ IOs can exert effective persua-
sion only within a relatively narrow range, and effectiveness demands attention to
domestic politics+
Appendix: Proofs of Propositions
Proposition 1
Proof. Suppose I truthfully reports its signal, that is, mI  sI  $0,1% + We show
that for some parameter range of k, this cannot be an equilibrium+
~1! Suppose mI 0 and it is public knowledge+ Then the players’ updated belief
that u1 is m0 Pr~u16mI 0!1 a+39 If G chooses policy itself, then the
policy is the solution to the following maximization problem:
39+ In all proofs, the subscript of m will refer to the signal reported by I and E+
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max
x0
EUG ~x 6mI  0! ~1m0 !~x!m0~x1! kx
The optimal solution is
xG  0 if k 2m01,1 if k  2m01+ ~3!
Because m0  102 and k  0, G will choose x  0+ Now consider G’s decision
whether to delegate the policy choice to E+ Given sI  0, the expert will receive
sE  0 with Pr~sE  0 6sI  0!  ab  ~1  a!~1  b! and sE  1 with
Pr ~sE  16sI  0!  a  b  2ab+ If E receives sE  0, E’s updated
belief about the state of the world being 1 is Pr ~u  16sE  0,mI  0!

~1 a!~1 b!




, and it will recommend x  0+ If E receives sE  1,







, in which case E will choose policy x  1+ Essentially,
because the quality of the expert’s signal is better than the institution’s, the expert
will choose a policy that is consistent with its own signal+ As a result, by del-
egating the policy to E, the expected utility for G is EUG~E6mI  0!  b  1
 ~a  b  2ab!k+ G will compare this expected utility with that from choos-
ing a policy by itself after I’s message, EUG~¬E6mI  0!  a  1+ G will choose




, then G will delegate+
~2! Suppose mI  1+ Then G knows u 1 with m1 Pr~u 16mI  1! a+ If




EUG ~x 6mI  1! ~1m1!~x!m1~x1! kx
The optimal solution is
xG  0 if k 2m11,1 if k  2m11+ ~4!
Because m1  102, G can either choose x  0 or x  1, depending on the size
of k+ For k  2a  1, G will choose x  0+
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Now consider G’s decision whether to delegate the policy choice to E+ Given sI
 1, by delegating the policy to E the expected utility for G is EUG~E6mI  1!
1 b ~1 a b 2ab!k+ G will compare this expected utility with that
from choosing a policy itself after I’s message+ Suppose k  2a  1, then
EUG~¬E6mI  1!  a+ We find that if k 
a b1
1 a b 2ab
 2a  1, then
G will choose its own policy; if 2a  1  k 
a b1
1 a b 2ab
, then G
will delegate+ Suppose k  2a  1, then EUG~¬E6mI  1!  a  1  k+ We
find that G will choose its own policy, if k
a b
a b 2ab
+ The condition cannot
be true because b  a; therefore, in this case G will always delegate+ In sum, if
k 
a b1
1 a b 2ab
, then G delegates+ Compared with the case mI  0, for a
larger range of k, G will delegate+40
Given G’s strategy, does I have an incentive to deviate from the truth-telling
strategy?
Suppose sI 0+ If I reports truthfully so that mI 0, then G will choose its own
policy if k 
b a
a b 2ab
+ If I deviates from truth-telling and sends mI  1 to
G, then G will choose its own policy if k 
a b1
1 a b 2ab
+ Because the qual-
ity of E’s information is higher than that of the institution’s, I is better off when G






1 a b 2ab
+ Now we consider three scenarios
of the cost:
1+ k  k1, then G will delegate receiving either message from I+ So I has no
incentive to lie+
2+ k1  k  k2, then G will not delegate when mI  0, but will delegate when
mI  1+ So I has an incentive to lie+
3+ k  k2, then G will not delegate in either case+ So I has no incentive to lie+
As a result, I has an incentive to lie if k1  k  k2+
Suppose sI  1+ Again we have three cases to consider and only when k1  k
 k2, G will delegate contingent on I’s message+ But in this case, I has no incen-
tive to lie because G will delegate if I reports truthfully, and will not delegate if I
reports mI  0+ As a result, I will always tell the truth when sI  1+
40+ It can be shown that
a b1











1 a b 2ab
, there is no truth-
telling equilibrium; for other values of k, a truth-telling equilibrium exists;
however, the government ignores IO’s message and either always delegates
k b a
a b 2ab  or never delegates k a b11 a b 2ab +
Proposition 2
Proof+ Suppose with p the expert is reform-biased, that is, the expert always pre-
fers policy 1+ Below we show that if p 
b a
a b1
, then there is a truth-telling
equilibrium+
Consider the equilibrium in which I truthfully reports its signal, that is, mI  sI
 $0,1% +
~1! Suppose mI 0 and it is public knowledge+ Then the players’ updated belief
that u  1 is m0 Pr~u  16mI  0!  1  a+ If G chooses policy by itself, then
the policy is the solution to the following maximization problem:
max
x0
EUG ~x 6mI  0! ~1m0 !~x!m0~x1! kx
The optimal solution is
xG  0 if k 2m01,1 if k  2m01+ ~5!
Because m0  102 and k  0, G will choose x  0+ Now consider G’s decision
whether to delegate the policy choice to the expert E+ G knows that with 1 p, E
is unbiased and will choose a policy that is consistent with E’s updated belief
about the state of the world; with p, E is biased and will recommend simply x 1
regardless of the signal E receives+ As a result, by delegating the policy to E the
expected utility for G is:
EUG ~E6mI  0!abp~1 k! ~1 a!~1 b!~1ppk!
 a~1 b!~1 k! b~1 a!k ~6!
G will compare this expected utility with that from choosing a policy itself
after I’s message, EUG ~¬E 6mI  0!  a  1+ Because having the biased
expert is even more likely to lead to policy x  1, the threshold value of
k that will give G an incentive to delegate is going to be smaller than
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the case where there is no biased expert+ We find the threshold to be k1'

b a ~a b1!p
abp ~1 a!~1 b!p a~1 b! b~1 a!




, then k1'  0+41 That is, if p is small enough, then G will
choose a policy by itself if k  k1' + This result is similar to the case of unbiased
expert+ If p 
b a
a b1
, then k1'  0, which means for any positive k, G will
choose its own policy+
~2! Suppose mI  1+ Then G knows u 1 with m1 Pr~u 16mI  1! a+ If




EUG ~x 6mI  1! ~1m1!~x!m1~x1! kx
The optimal solution is
xG  0 if k 2m11,1 if k  2m11+
Because m1  102, G can either choose x  0 or x  1, depending on the size of
k+ For k  2a  1, G will choose x  0+
On the other hand, if G delegates, then the expected utility for G is:
EUG ~E6mI  1!b~1 a!p~1 k! a~1 b!~1ppk!
 ~1 a b ab!~1 k! abk ~7!
G will compare this expected utility with that from choosing a policy by itself
after I’s message+
Suppose k  2a  1, then G will choose x  0 if it chooses
the policy by itself, and EUG~¬E6mI  1!  a+ Let k2'

a b1 ~a b!p
~a b 2ab!p ~1 a b 2ab!
 0+ We find that if k  k2' , then
G will choose the policy by itself; and if 2a 1  k  k2' , then it will delegate to
the expert+42




42+ It can be shown that 2a  1  k2' for all p  0+
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Now suppose k  2a 1, then G will choose x 1 if it chooses the policy by
itself, and EUG~¬E6mI  1!  a  1  k+ We find that G will choose its own
policy if k 
a b
a b 2ab
+ The condition cannot be true because b  a; there-
fore, in this case G will always delegate+ In sum, if k  k2' , then G delegates+
Compared with the case mI  0, for a larger range of k, G will delegate+43
Given G’s strategy, does I have an incentive to deviate from the truth-telling
strategy? We first consider the case that p 
b a
a b1
, so that 0  k1'  k2' +
Suppose sI  0+ If I reports truthfully so that mI  0, then G will take that
information and choose its own policy if k  k1' + If I deviates from truth-telling
and sends mI  1 to G, then G will choose its own policy if k  k2' + With the
existence of the biased type, I is not always better off from policy delegation+
Now we consider three scenarios:
1+ k  k1' , then G will delegate receiving either message from I+ So I has no
incentive to lie+
2+ k1'  k  k2' , then G will not delegate when mI  0, but will delegate when
mI  1+ This is a case where I may have an incentive to lie+ If I is truth-
ful, then G will not delegate and choose policy 0+ Then I’s expected utility
is a  1+ If I lies, then G will delegate to the expert+ The expected utility




, I is better off being truthful and let G choose the policy+
This contradicts the assumption that p 
b a
a b1
for this case+ There-
fore, I will always have an incentive to lie in this case+44
3+ k  k2' , then G will not delegate in either case+ So I has no incentive to lie+




, then there is no truth-telling equilibrium because I has an
incentive to lie when mI  0+
Now consider the case that p 
b a
a b1
+ Because k1'  0 in this case, there
are only two scenarios to consider:
43+ It can be shown that k2'  k1' +
44+ When p 
b a
a b1
, I is indifferent and we assume that I will be truthful+
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1+ 0 , k , k2' , then G will not delegate if mI  0, but delegate if mI




, then I is better off reporting mI  0 and let G choose the
policy+ Therefore, I will be truthful in this case+ Suppose sI  1+ Again, from
the previous analysis we know that for all 1  p  0, I receives a higher
payoff from policy delegation, so I will be truthful+
2+ k  k2' , then G will not delegate given either mI and choose x  0+ So I has
no incentive to lie+
In sum, with the existence of the reform-biased expert, I has an incentive to lie
for some range of k when receiving signal sI  0; however, if the probability of
encountering the biased type is sufficiently high p  b a
a b1 , then I will be
truthful for all k+
Proposition 3
The proof of proposition 3 is omitted because it is very similar to those of the
other two propositions+ Interested readers can refer to the authors’ websites for
detailed proofs+
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